Posted by
RabbiHaim on Tuesday, May 29, 2007 6:56:43 PM
We worry about hostages. Our thoughts move to the edges of darkness and we try to understand what hostages are going through in their captivity. We think immediately of torture and discomfort. We mortify ourselves dwelling on our inability to release our comrades from captivity. We, in fact, are the hostages!
That last thought is the reason for taking hostages. When I first joined the U.S. Army I learned that on a battlefield a wounded soldier is worth between four and five [dead] soldiers. A wounded soldier cries out to his/her comrades. A wounded soldier needs immediate attention. A wounded soldier often needs to be evacuated from the field of battle.
A final contribution of a wounded soldier to the enemy effort is a little more complicated, in that it deals with the complicated psychology of soldiers. A wounded soldier effects what psychologists call “the cloak of invincibility,” which, psychologists agree, is what allows people to function on a battlefield. Every soldier must believe in personal invincibility to function. While others may be killed to the right and to the left of him/her, (s)he must continually be reassured of their own invincibility. Another soldier, among his/her comrades being killed or injured can either bolster this feeling or weaken it. The soldier not hit will either say, “You see, even when they are hitting people all around me, I am unscratched,” or “They are picking us off one at a time and I must be next.”
A hostage is just like a wounded soldier on the field of battle. A hostage differs significantly from a “prisoner of war.” A prisoner of war has certain rights guaranteed by international convention(s). Hostages are a distinct category in that armies don’t take hostages; nor do civilized governments. Hostage taking is the civil crime of kidnapping by another name. In wars or other military actions, hostage taking is done by paramilitary organizations, and not by armies.
In a kidnapping it is common to “make demands” on the family for something that the kidnapper(s) want. Even in the Middle East, the earlier hostage takings were preludes to demands for some form of ransom from the families or governments interested in the release of the hostage(s). Today, however, it seems that hostage takers have become a bit more sophisticated in their demands.
Let us look at two current hostage situations:
1. In a roadside attack, three American soldiers were taken hostage by person or persons unknown. This, in itself, is an interesting development in the Mid-East, as perpetrators have regularly boasted immediately after each and every action either as a part of a recruiting effort or merely for publicity. The ransom demand, in this case also was delayed at least several days. When it arrived, the ransom demand was that the “foreign invaders leave,” which is a demand very unlikely to be met. This demand may, in fact, be considered to be fictitious but presented as a means to continue publicity of the incident. The U.S. military has not only stated, but also taken action in line with its resolve to find the kidnapped soldiers. The military is conducting broad search sweeps into areas where they suspect that the hostages might be being held.
After the military began the large scale actions to find and liberate the kidnapped soldiers, the kidnappers announced that unless the search was called off, they “would not be able to guarantee the safety” of the hostages. This is an interesting statement, but note that it translates to “if you get close, we will kill them.”
After nearly two weeks of U.S. operations searching for the hostages, a body was found. The purpose of this dead body was to remind the American military (and the American people), that the hostage takers are in absolute control of the fate of the hostages. It is obvious that the “wounded soldier” effect of hostages is only a working analogy as long as we are unsure of the fate of the kidnapped soldiers. Secondly, the lack of any videos or sound recordings of the hostages indicate the precarious position of the hostage takers; they fear the identification of hide-outs by sophisticated analysis tools available to the Americans.
Let us subject this situation to a “cost-benefit analysis.” What is to be gained by the hostage takers continuing to hold these American soldiers, and what is to be lost?
Gains:
- 1. Diversion of American/coalition forces.
- 2. Diversion of American/coalition attention from other operations which the hostage takers may be planning.
- 3. Anguish to not only the troops in the field, but also to the citizenry, who are not too sure about this war.
- 4. Possible negative effect on the “cloak of invincibility” among the troops.
Losses:
- 1. Concentration of American/coalition forces on areas where the hostage takers are active.
- 2. Diversion of American/coalition civilian attention from the debate as to the nature/purpose of the war.
- 3. Reinforcement of the perception that the “enemy” is bad/evil/wrong/barbaric chose which you will.
- 4. Increased protection of American/coalition forces in the area; “hardening of targets.”
- 5. They only have two hostages now, and can only use each once as a dead body.
- 6. So far, the forces engaged in the search operations have captured/killed nearly one hundred anti-Iraqi fighters as a “collateral benefit.”
2. Over a year ago, a group of terrorists attacked an Israel Defense Force post and captured Corporal Gilad Shalit. As in the case above, the group responsible has not identified itself definitively. In this case, though, that is merely a technicality. Who kidnapped and is currently holding Corporal Shalit is well known, at least to the Palestinian Authority. Despite repeated disavowals of complicity, the PA; both Hamas and Fatah have repeatedly had contact with the kidnappers, and have advised Israel of the safety and health of Corporal Shalit.
With the Shalit kidnapping, initially there was no ransom demand, although a ransom is being negotiated between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in a mode called “back channel.” What Corporal Shalit’s kidnappers want is all the benefits of a kidnapping. In Israel there is an added factor, in that on some levels Israel functions as an extended family. Gilad is every Israeli’s son, as are the other two hostages, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser (who were captured later by the Huz’ballers). This is visible in that while the American soldiers are anonymous and will remain so until they are freed or found, Gilad, Eldad and Ehud are all known throughout Israel and a large part of the world. Israel is a society with very little anonymity.
In the earlier example I built a “Cost-Benefit Analysis” for the terrorist action of kidnapping. It was not by any means extensive nor comprehensive, but just using the points made above, let us see how that matches up with the situation in Israel.
Gains:
1. Diversion of IDF forces is not happening. In fact the IDF’s forces and attention appear to be concentrated on attempts to effect the release of the hostage(s).
2. Diversion of IDF attention from other operations which the hostage takers may be planning is not occurring. IDF actions against all flavors of Palestinian terror activities as well as military threats from Israel’s neighbors continue as in the past.
3. Anguish to not only the troops in the field, but also to the citizenry, who are not too sure about this war. While Israel has been in a state of war with its neighbors for even longer than it has existed as a Modern State, there is much doubt in Israel as to the conduct of the Government and/or Military Leadership.
4. Possible negative effect on the “cloak of invincibility” among the troops. This also exists in Israel. It is being felt at a National level, beside the individual level common on the battlefield, it is also being felt on the political front as a threat to the Olmert coalition government.
Losses:
1. Concentration of IDF forces on areas where the hostage takers are active. While this is a possible losing outcome, the IDF has not conducted the type of search operation that the American/coalition forces are conducting in Iraq. This type of sweep/clearing operation might be in the works for the near future though it would come under the banner of an operation to stop the missiles being fired into Sderot on a daily basis.
2. Diversion of Israel civilian attention from the debate as to the nature/purpose of the war. Actually, in the case of Israel, the kidnappings and their consequences have driven public debate on the affectivity of the Government/Military Leadership. The attention to this debate in Israel is the equivalent to the diversion of attention from the debate in the U.S.
3. Reinforcement of the perception that the “enemy” is bad/evil/wrong/barbaric chose which you will. This remains true in Israel, although Israel is a very special case in that in all polls from the earliest, in 1948, Jewish Israelis consistently bear less animosity against Arab Israelis and/or Palestinians than do Arabs/Palestinians against Jews/Israelis.
4. Increased protection of Israel positions in the area; “hardening of targets.” Although the government has been loath to protect Sderot and other targets within Israel, it seems that the government is now coming around to some organized “hardening” in response to public pressure and Hamas demonstration of newer longer range rockets which have landed close to Israel’s major power station in Ashkelon.
5. They have three hostages now, and can only use each once as a dead body. In Israel, a live Israeli is always important to the government and to the public in general. There are many other Israeli soldiers in the hands of the enemies of Israel, and Israel has had a policy of trading large numbers of convicted felons for very small numbers of Israelis held captive. In addition to this, the bodies of dead Israelis are historically traded in prisoner exchanges at the same (extremely unbalanced) rate as live Israeli captives.
6. So far, the forces engaged in the search operations have captured/killed hundreds of anti-Israel fighters as a “collateral benefit.” In fact, the combined operations in Lebanon and in Gaza have caused large numbers of casualties on the Palestinian side and relatively (numerically) fewer casualties on the Israeli side.
My solution to the situation with regard to the taking of hostages and dealing with hostage taking is simple to state and difficult to effect. When I served as a prison chaplain in Arizona, and in Georgia, one of the first documents I was required to sign was a simple statement of policy by the respective prison systems. The document stated clearly that if at any time I were to be taken hostage no effort would be made to affect my release. All efforts would be directed toward bringing the perpetrator(s) to justice, and if that lead to my release, that would be OK. In short, hostages must be accepted to be dead from the moment that they are taken, and all efforts must be directed toward the capture and punishment of the hostage taker(s). This is sound policy from a law enforcement viewpoint. While on one level we must continue to consider that all hostages are still alive until it is proven otherwise, we must not allow our concern for the safety of the hostages to limit our efforts to capture and punish the hostage takers.
This is what we must do and how we must act for our own sanity. This may to some degree dissuade hostage taking, but considering the social-religious-political background of the hostage takers in these two incidents, we cannot hold out a lot of hope that we can cause these specific groups to stop engaging in practices which are not only condoned from the pulpit, but are encouraged. We may eventually win if we maintain our strong will, but we must realize that this enemy is a massive international NGO. They are at war with us and we must be at war with them. It is a war for our own survival.